Mugabe faces dilemma

Mugabe faces dilemma
Author: Brian Raftopoulos
Category: Zimbabwe
Date: 2/24/2007
Source: The Zimbabwe Independent.
Source Website: http://www.thezimbabweindependent.com

Summary & Comment: The Zimbabwean crisis has reached the point where a
number of factors are combining to introduce a new political dynamic into
the current situation. These include the confluence of drastic economic
decline, growing internal dissent within the ruling party, a renewed wave
of labour and civic activism, and the continued isolation of the regime by
Western countries.

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Mugabe faces dilemma

http://www.thezimbabweindependent.com/viewinfo.cfm?linkid=21&id=10068&siteid=1

The Zimbabwean crisis has reached the point where a number of factors are
combining to introduce a new political dynamic into the current situation.
These include:
- the confluence of drastic economic decline,
- growing internal dissent within the ruling party,
- a renewed wave of labour and civic activism, and
- the continued isolation of the regime by Western countries.

In the face of these growing challenges, the response of President Robert
Mugabe has been to seek an extension of his presidential mandate until 2010
in order to seek more time to deal with the destructive succession debate
in the ruling Zanu PF party, ensure his own immunity from possible
prosecution and create more frustration for the divided opposition Movement
for Democratic Change (MDC).

The economic challenges facing the Mugabe regime are immense

In a statement responding to the monetary policy statement by the Reserve
Bank governor, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) painted a
gloomy picture of the indicators of economic decline. These included
hyperinflation of 1 600% as at December 2006, a cumulative economic decline
of about 50% over the past seven years, an unsustainable budget deficit of
43% of GDP, chronic shortage of foreign currency, sporadic availability of
fuel, skills shortages, and mass unemployment and the collapse of real
earnings of workers.

In this regard there is anecdotal evidence of numbers of workers preferring
not to continue working in the formal sector because of the high cost of
staying in employment, preferring instead to engage in various informal
sector activities. The ZCTU and both factions of the MDC agree in
characterising the contemporary Zimbabwean economy as based on
"rent-seeking" and speculative behaviour. Distortions created by
developments such as price controls and foreign exchange controls create
rents.

As Zimbabwean economist Rob Davies writes, this "creates an incentive for
people to devote resources capturing rents, rather then using them for
productive purposes". Tendai Biti, the economic spokesperson of the
Tsvangirai MDC, observes that at the core of the crisis is the crippled
supply side of the economy. "The scenario of non-existent supply," notes
Biti, "creates fertile ground for middlemen and the rule of rent-seeking
activities." Evidence of this rent-seeking behaviour abounds in the
Zimbabwean economy. The Grain Marketing Board (GMB) was, until last week,
buying maize at $52 000 per tonne and selling it to select millers at $600
per tonne. Politically connected individuals were able to buy the
subsidised maize from the GMB, get it milled at commercial millers and then
sell it at exorbitant prices.

Similar speculative activities take place in the fuel and fertiliser
sectors where the new farmers who have benefited from the land occupations
are receiving subsidised inputs from the state and selling them rather than
using them for productive activities. As Arthur Mutambara, leader of the
other MDC faction, states: "The distortions in our economy create
opportunities for arbitrage."

In such an economy the emphasis of many of the emerging business
individuals is on fast-track accumulation through such speculative
activities, exploiting the breakdown of the rule of law and the corruption
of the state to accumulate vast profits through unproductive activities.
This is a key constituency that has been created by the authoritarian
politics of the Mugabe regime, and the indigenisation of economic
activities has largely been carried out through this means. Moreover, an
important part of the battle for succession within ZANU PF has been fought
over access to various such rent-seeking activities, and the fortunes that
then become available for further political consolidation within the party.

In the midst of these activities there are no doubt businesspersons who
continue to think about the longer-term need to maintain and build up
productive activities both in the industrial and agricultural sectors. The
problem, however, is that this parasitic accumulation model is taking place
within a broader context of endemic poverty and a steady decrease in the
percentage share of wages in the gross domestic income. The standard of
living of workers has reached desperately low levels, fuelled by a general
ruling party antipathy to urban workers, and epitomised by the massive
human rights violations of the "urban clean up" Operation Murambatsvina in
mid-2005. The result has been a renewed wave of labour, student and civic
protests since the beginning of the year.

In the field of labour protests, public sector workers have led the
response to the state. Junior doctors earning $56 000 per month, nurses $35
000 and teachers $84 000 have come out on strike or go-slows. Even unions
that have had less confrontational relations with the state, such as the
Zimbabwe Teachers' Association and the Public Services Association, have
threatened to take industrial action in the next week if their salary
demands are not met. Other protests from the constitutional movement,
women's organisations and students have created additional pressure on the
state.

These protests resemble the labour unrest in the second half of the 1990s,
also triggered by the 1996 public sector strike that was the first
indicator of the force of labour that would play a major part in
challenging the state during this period. There are, however, some
differences with this current period of unrest. In the late 1990s the
structures of the labour movement were much stronger, developed through
strong organisational and educational capacity in the ZCTU.

The effective use of consultative labour forums ensured greater ownership
of collective actions by the union membership. Additionally during this
period the labour movement was able to "speak for the nation" in their
messaging and demands and build effective alliances with other civic
groups. In the current period the structures of the labour movement have
been weakened by a combination of structural changes in the labour force,
state repression, decreased organisational and educational capacity and a
leadership that has placed more emphasis on the ZCTU taking actions on its
own with less emphasis on building broader civic alliances.

Part of the explanation for this more narrow focus of the ZCTU can be found
in the difficult relations that have arisen between the labour movement and
both the MDC and the civics. The labour leadership perhaps feels that it
has been used and marginalised within the broader political processes in
the opposition. However, this recoil from coalition building is likely to
encounter limits very quickly given the need to develop a broad front
against Zimbabwe's authoritarian state. It is thus unclear whether the
militancy of the present leadership will translate unto a broader
participation by the union membership and the general public in mass actions.

There is little doubt also that the division in the MDC that took place
after October 12 2005 has weakened both sides of the party and created
confusion and demoralisation among its supporters and in the civic
movement. Over the last year there have been attempts to heal the breach in
the opposition and this has led to the signing of a code of conduct between
the two formations, designed to lessen their public hostility and violence.
This has certainly been a step forward for both sides, but urgent efforts
need to be taken to strengthen the strategic and electoral cooperation
between the two groups, whether there is a presidential election in 2008 or
2010.

Both formations at present belong to the Save Zimbabwe Campaign led by
church leaders, and also bringing together all the major civic groups in
the country. The major demand of this campaign is that there should be a
presidential election in 2008 under a new constitution, thus opposing
Mugabe's move to delay this election to 2010. One of the consequences of
both MDC formations working under this umbrella is that one or both
factions may feel less need to pursue the possibility of re-unification,
but instead use the momentum of the campaign to push their separate
agendas. This is likely to be a mistake in the longer term as closer
cooperation between the two MDCs is essential to confront Zanu PF.

It is against this background that the recent monetary statement by Reserve
Bank governor Gideon Gono needs to be understood. In many ways the
statement is an admission of a policy dead-end and recognition that the
primary problem in the country is the political blockage being created by
Mugabe's actions. In the statement, Gono desperately called for the
establishment of a social contract between the government, business and
labour, seeking to use this vehicle to attempt to achieve what the
political leadership is unwilling to attempt. Clearly in the present
political conditions the call for a social contract is unrealistic, given
the unwillingness of the state to confront the political challenges around
democratisation, which would be essential to a workable agreement between
the three legs of a tripartite arrangement.

Gono's call for a social contract in Zimbabwe is not new, as the ZCTU
proposed it, under different circumstances, in its 1996 document "Beyond
Esap". Instead the government set up the National Economic Consultative
Forum in 1997 and the Tripartite Negotiating Forum in 1998 which, in the
words of the Labour and Economic Development Institute of Zimbabwe, "have
either become talk-shops or their decisions have been largely ignored".

Both Mugabe's attempt to extend his presidency to 2010 and Gono's attempt
to draw other social forces into a social contract should be seen as
Mugabe's attempt to control change in Zimbabwe under his tutelage and that
of his party. The recent cabinet reshuffle confirmed Mugabe's need to
maintain the support of his loyalists as he attempts to get his proposal
for a 2010 extension of the presidential election confirmed by the ZANU PF
politburo. Under this proposal it is likely that Mugabe would appoint a
prime minister who would still be responsible to him, as his position as a
purportedly "ceremonial president" provides him with continued immunity
from possible prosecution for crimes against humanity.

Such a move could then possibly be a precursor to small reforms in the
political and economic arenas, as a prelude to an election in which Mugabe
would hope to defeat the opposition under a new candidate, and prepare the
way for a "normalisation" of his regime. However, Alexis de Tocqueville's
warning that the "most dangerous time for a bad government is when it
starts to reform itself" should be a reminder to Mugabe that once small
reforms are introduced it is often difficult to control the change. Under
the present political conditions Mugabe's government, as with all
authoritarian regimes, must continue to choose between compromise and
repression, or more specifically the particular blend of both. It is likely
that in the short term Mugabe will continue to emphasise state coercion in
dealing with dissent in the country.

However, the continued availability of this option will depend among other
factors on the capacity of the opposition and civic forces to mount more
effective popular resistance to the regime, the continued loyalty of the
police and army in the face of deteriorating economic conditions for the
armed forces, Mugabe's capacity to contain and resolve the succession
debate in his party and the ongoing pressure and isolation from the West.
Mugabe is likely to be acutely aware of the transition dangers that befell
the authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe after 1989 and the lessons of
his Chinese friends at Tiananmen Square.

All the indications are that 2007 will be a crucial year marking the
Zimbabwean crisis. If Mugabe continues to deploy authoritarian strategies
in response to the political opposition, both the economic and the
political conditions will deteriorate further, and the international
isolation of the regime is likely to continue. On the other hand if Mugabe
attempts a controlled reform process, the new political spaces opened are
likely to provide additional momentum for the political and civic
opposition, and the internal threat to ZANU PF will intensify. Caught
between an unproductive confrontational strategy that he would prefer and a
reform strategy whose consequences he is unlikely to be able to control,
Mugabe is faced with a very difficult political dilemma.

On the other hand ZANU PF's capacity to re-invent itself in part should not
be dismissed, especially if the opposition forces facilitate this option by
further strategic blunders. It would not be the first time that
authoritarian regimes have carried out a semblance of reform while
retaining the core of the former government. There are several such
examples in both Africa and Eastern Europe. Such an outcome would not be
unfavourable for a South African government that has always been more
concerned with the "stability" of its neighbour than with a more profound
democratic transition.

*Brian Raftopoulos is head of the Africa programme at the Institute for
Justice
and Reconciliation in Cape Town, South Africa.